Related Case Pleadings in Dallas, TX, a Potential Pitfall for Temporary Restraining Orders (TRO)

Local Rule 1.06-1.08 of the Dallas County Civil Courts local rules adopted January 15th, 2014 provides a related-case requirement that can potentially prevent a Temporary Restraining Order from being granted. Under Rule 1.06, the Judge in the earliest case filed of any related cases has the option of consolidating the later-filed cases into the earliest case. Rule 1.07 defines later cases and the definition is quite broad. Rule 1.08 requires the filing attorney to make a detailed disclosure of the related case in the pleadings. Rule 1.08 requires the answering attorney to point out any failure of the filing attorney to make this disclosure in the pleadings. Moreover, both filing and answering attorneys, by failing to properly disclose related cases, certified that there are no prior related cases.

In the event that a party files for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), either ex parte or otherwise, and fails to make the proper related case disclosure for an eviction case, title dispute, or other applicable related case, then the TRO may be denied on the grounds of failure to include the related case in the pleadings. Due to the certification by nondisclosure rule, the failure to disclose the related cases could result in parties waiving rights to contest transfers or failures to transfer.

Disclaimer: This blog is for informational purposes only. Do not rely on any part of this blog as legal advice. Instead, seek out the advice of a licensed attorney. Also, this information may be out-of-date.

Reimbursement of Your Attorney’s Fees When You Win Your Case

The so-called “American Rule” provides that, in most of the United States—Texas included, each side to a lawsuit, Plaintiff and Defendant, must pay its own attorney’s fees. While we inherited most of our legal system from the British common law, we do not generally follow the “English Rule,” which states that the losing side pays the other side’s attorney’s fees. In Texas, however, there are countless exceptions to the American Rule. For example, attorney’s fees are recoverable from the losing side in breach of contract cases, cases involving a declaratory judgment, Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act claims, etcetera.

What the general public rarely understands is that reimbursement of your attorney’s fees when you win your case is hardly automatic. Attorneys will rarely (probably never) accept a breach of contract case for a plaintiff and simply bill the defendant for the legal work. The reason is that when the trial ends, together with all of the appeals (if a supersedeas bond has been posted), the winning party does not actually receive payment for the legal fees. Instead, the winning party receives a monetary judgment against the losing party for the attorney’s fees. That monetary judgment can then be enforced using all of the post-judgment collections procedures that are available under Texas law. This generally means recording an abstract of judgment in counties where the judgment debtor owns real estate and filing for a writ of execution against any non-exempt property owned by the judgment debtor, but there are other collections methods as well, like garnishment, receivership, or turnover proceedings. The amount of legal work that is necessary to collect on a monetary judgment can be quite substantial and no one wants to perform all of the legal work necessary to complete a trial, only to create more post-judgment legal work for themselves, unless the prospects for recovery are high. Also, the attorney’s fees incurred in performing the post-judgment collections activities are generally non-recoverable. So, you may get a judgment for your attorney’s fees, and still have to pay your attorney to go collect on that judgment.

To make things more complex, the winning side does not receive a judgment for attorney’s fees actually “incurred.” See Sloan v. Owners Ass’n of Westfield, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2005) (“The terms of the fee agreement between the [Defendant] and its counsel are irrelevant to the [Defendant’s] right to recover reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees from the [Plaintiff].”) Instead, the winning party generally receives a judgment for “reasonable and necessary” attorney’s fees, which may be completely different from the fees that the party actually incurred. Interestingly enough, the terms of the party’s contract with his or her attorney may be completely irrelevant to the amount of fees that will be awarded at trial. Moreover, an attorney representing himself or his law firm can probably recover attorney’s fees for his or her own time spent on the case. McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1488 (5th Cir. Tex. 1990).

Contingency Fees:

When an attorney accepts a case based on a contingency fee, the contingency fee may be determined by the Court to be “reasonable and necessary.” Sloan v. Owners Ass’n of Westfield, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 401 (Tex. App. San Antonio 2005). Generally, “the fact that attorney’s fees are based on a contingent fee agreement does not make the fees requested or awarded unreasonable.” Cooper v. Cochran, 288 S.W.3d 522, 537 (Tex. App. Dallas 2009).

Winning on Some Claims and Losing on Other Claims:

If you prevail on some claims for which attorney’s fees are available, yet lose on other claims, then the attorney’s fee award gets very tricky. If your attorney provides detailed, itemized billing sheets and proves those sheets up in Court, then the sheets may be enough evidence for the Judge to break out the recoverable fees from the non-recoverable fees. Even if the bill sheets do not exist because it is a contingency fee case, your attorney should “reconstruct” the work to “provide the trial court with sufficient information to allow the court to perform a meaningful review of the fee.”
Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. 2014).

Copyright 2017, Ian Ghrist, All Rights Reserved.

Disclaimer: This blog is for informational purposes only. Do not rely on any part of this blog as legal advice. Instead, seek out the advice of a licensed attorney. Also, this information may be out-of-date.

Global Mutual Liability Releases

Sometimes, at the end of a lawsuit, in the final draft of a settlement agreement that has been months or years in the making, one of the parties will casually throw in a global mutual liability release that is not limited to the transactions or occurrences that are the subject of the litigation. Sometimes, this clause is non-negotiable and sometimes, the party inserting the clause waits until the last possible moment to add the clause to the draft, knowing that the other side will probably sign it rather than throw away months or years of negotiations. The clause is inserted when the settlement momentum is at its peak.

When so much work has been done to reach a resolution and the end is in sight, a firm desire arises to simply sign to the clause now and litigate over it later if it becomes a problem. Since the released claims are often unknown or speculative, it is easy to assume that you cannot possibly release something that you do not know about regardless of what the settlement paperwork says.

In California, at least, this is true. You cannot settle claims that a “creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1542. California courts have, however, held that Civil Code Section 1542 is waivable, which sort of defeats the purpose of the statute. Mundy v. Lenc, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1401, 1405 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2012); Perez v. Uline, Inc. 157 Cal App 4th 953 (2007, 4th Dist.).

At least in some states, you may not be able to prospectively release liability. “[P]rovisions for release from liability for personal injury which may be caused by future acts of negligence are prohibited ‘universally.’” Hiett v. Lake Barcroft Community Ass’n, 244 Va. 191, 195 (Va. 1992).

A release of a negligence claim can be contested on the grounds of fraud, ambiguity, mistake, or fair notice (“express negligence” and conspicuousness). Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994). The express negligence doctrine states that a party seeking indemnity from the consequences of that party’s own negligence must express that intent in specific terms within the four corners of the contract. Dresser Indus. v. Page Petroleum, 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993).

A release of gross negligence or intentional misconduct is probably unenforceable on public policy grounds. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 (1979) (“A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”); but see Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994) (gross negligence sometimes is not separable from regular negligence such that a waiver of regular negligence, in some cases, may also waive gross negligence).

It also bears mentioning that, in Texas, waivers of Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims are enforceable only if the consumer is not in a significantly disparate bargaining position, is represented by legal counsel, and waived rights under an express provision signed by both consumer and consumer’s attorney. Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 17.42(a).

Escaping a liability release based on unilateral mistake is tough. In Texas, you must show four factors: “(1) the mistake is of so great a consequence that to enforce the contract would be unconscionable; (2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the contract; (3) the mistake occurred despite ordinary care; and (4) the parties can be placed in status quo, i.e., the rescission must not prejudice the other party except for the loss of the bargain.” In re Green Tree Servicing LLC, 275 S.W.3d 592, 599 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008).

Mutual mistake, meanwhile, is easier. However, “[u]nilateral mistake by one party, and knowledge of that mistake by the other party, is equivalent to mutual mistake.” Givens v. Ward, 272 S.W.3d 63, 71 (Tex. App.–Waco 2008). “The question of mutual mistake is determined not by self-serving subjective statements of the parties’ intent, which would necessitate trial to a jury in all such cases, but rather solely by objective circumstances surrounding execution of the release, such as the knowledge of the parties at the time of signing concerning the injury, the amount of consideration paid, the extent of negotiations and discussions as to personal injuries, and the haste or lack thereof in obtaining the release. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 152 comment f (1981).” Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990). In Texas, under certain circumstances parties may release future personal injury claims. See, e.g., Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990); Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996). If causes of action are never discussed by the parties in the mediation or settlement process, then the lack of discussion constitutes some evidence that the parties may not have intended those claims to be released. Bolle, Inc. v. Am. Greetings Corp., 109 S.W.3d 827, 834 (Tex. App. Dallas 2003). In any situation where a cause of action is not specifically released, the aggrieved party should consider raising mutual mistake allegations and providing evidence of whether the parties “mutually agreed to a release agreement which differed from the one which was ultimately reduced to writing.” Matlock v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 925 F. Supp. 468, 475 (E.D. Tex. 1996). “If it can be established that a release sets out a bargain that was never made, it will be invalidated.” Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. 1990). “Pursuant to the doctrine of mutual mistake, when parties to an agreement have contracted under a misconception or ignorance of a material fact, the agreement will be voided.” Holmes v. Graham Mortg. Corp., 449 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tex. App. Dallas 2014). “Even if certain claims exist when the release is executed, claims not clearly within the subject matter of the release are not discharged.” City of Brownsville v. AEP Tex. Cent. Co., 348 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011). “This court has held that a trial court may properly refuse to enforce an [Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA)] that otherwise complies with the statute if a party procures the agreement by intentionally failing to disclose material information, and other courts have held that a trial court need not enforce an MSA that is illegal or that was obtained through fraud, duress, coercion or other dishonest methods. Additionally, the Dallas Court of Appeals has appeared to recognize that the absence of a meeting of the minds would justify a trial court’s rejection of an MSA, which is logical, given that a meeting of the minds is a required element of a valid contract.” Milner v. Milner, 360 S.W.3d 519, 523-524 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2010).

To avoid a release based on unconscionability and adhesion, there must be a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. Doing so is difficult. See Ramirez v. 24 Hour Fitness United States, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69451, *15 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 2013).

Copyright 2017, Ian Ghrist, All Rights Reserved.


Disclaimer
: This blog is for informational purposes only. Do not rely on any part of this blog as legal advice. Instead, seek out the advice of a licensed attorney. Also, this information may be out-of-date.